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Introduction
Renault was among the world's top ten car manufacturers in 2003, with an output close to 2.5 million vehicles (OICA 2003) . That same year, its Spanish subsidiary reached a peak of 550,000 cars, which consolidated it as the primary centre of Renault car production outside As Peter Buckley (2009) explains, despite differences in approaches, there are complementarities between international business and business history. Business history provides sources for testing international business theory such as internalization theory (Buckley and Casson 1976; Rugman 1980) ; the eclectic paradigm (Dunning 1979 (Dunning , 2001 ); the Uppsala internationalization process model (Johanson and Valhne 1977) ; the evolutionary theory of the firm (Nelson and Winter 1984; Chandler 1992; Teece and Pisano 1994; Dosi and Nelson 1994; Dosi 1995) ; and the resource-based view of the firm (Conner 1991; Peteraf 1993; Montgomery 1995) . For her part, Mira Wilkins (1977 Wilkins ( , 1998 Wilkins ( , and 2015 has highlighted that an important contribution from business historians is to instil recognition of the complexity of business enterprises as they emerge and mature, as managers and managerial directions change, and as the environment in which managers operate takes on different characteristics. Wilkins has also called on business historians to pay more attention to the development of European multinationals, suggesting both that the history of the expansion of share capital of 500,000 pesetas.
3 Its major shareholders were his wife and his brother Louis. 4 In 1929, its share capital had only multiplied by three, revealing a low level of activity. In fact, its results were actually quite poor. 5 Together with the commercial office in Madrid, SAEAR opened more offices across Spain. However, they had a short lifespan. Not only was the Spanish market unable to consume luxury goods such as cars, but also Renault was unable to compete with Ford or GM.
6
The Great Depression crushed the SAEAR, which finished every year in the red from 1930 to 1936 (Maison 1996) . The worst moment was in March 1933, when a one-million-peseta loss (two thirds of its share capital) left the subsidiary in dire straits. However, the company was saved by a capital increase of six million pesetas fully provided by Renault (Cebrian 2010) .
With the victory of the fascists in the Civil War (1936 War ( -1939 and the beginning of the autarchic phase, the SAEAR entered into a period of lethargy. Only when a Spanish firm acquired the production licences for the Renault 4CV in 1951 did the SAEAR recover its activity, since Renault made it the only distributor of that vehicle. 7 3 SAEAR, Actas de la Junta (Board Minutes), 17/3/1910. 4 Due to health reasons, Fernand Renault sold his shares to his brother Louis in 1908 and the company was transformed into the Société des Automobiles Louis Renault (SAUR). For his part, Marcel Renault, the third brother, died in a car accident that took place during a race between Paris and Madrid in 1903. 5 The worst results were obtained in 1917 with a profit of 12,700 pesetas, while the best year was 1929 with a profit of 321,600 pesetas. Profits rarely exceeded 50,000 pesetas up until 1919, while they were around 200,000 pesetas during the 1920s (Cebrian 2010, 154) . 6 SAEAR sold around a thousand cars per year from 1924 to 1935, its peak being 1,654 units in 1929 and its lowest point being 180 units in 1932 (Cebrian 2010, 156 to Renault as a model enterprise for recovery and economic growth (Fridenson 1997 (Fridenson , 2014 8 At that time, the percentage was in the region of 15% (Loubet 2000) . 9 The Dauphine's price was set under 1,600 dollars, which covered a mere 75% of its cost (Loubet 2000) . specifically the factories in Argentina, Brazil, and Spain. With this structure, the goal was to remove the impact of those investments from the profit and loss account presented in France.
Six years later, and with the aim of yielding the dividends from the international shares in Switzerland, Renault-Holding set up Renault-Finance. In order to manage and coordinate both 10 During the rest of the decade, Renault only sold 15,000 cars of the models R-10, R-12, and R-16 per year, a very poor result if we take into account that the break-even point was in the region of 50,000 units per year (Loubet 2000) . 11 Renault sold 120,000 cars in the Common Market, 31,000 in the United States, and 5,000 in the United Kingdom (Loubet 2000) . 12 Factories in Israel (1956 ), Brazil (1959 , Argentina (1960), and Venezuela (1963) belonged to the Kaiser Group, while the Japanese factory (1953) belonged to Hino Diesel. In South Africa (1953) and Chile (1964) , Renault was associated first with American Motors and then with Peugeot. Other factories belonged to public enterprises and holdings, as was the case of Mexico (1960 ), Quebec (1965 ), and Colombia (1970 , and socialist countries such as Algeria (1960), Bulgaria (1966) , and Romania (1968) (Loubet 2000) . (Freyssenet 1998) .
Renault in Italy
In the early post-war period, both the protectionist policy and Fiat's supremacy had dissuaded
Renault from establishing a commercial subsidiary in Italy. 13 Likewise, Volkswagen and Ford had refused to establish factories in Sicily and Naples respectively, due to Fiat's threat of promoting a specific law that would force foreign firms to export all the cars produced. With this mind, a decade later, Renault knew that an alliance with a local carmaker was the only way to enter the Italian market. However, in 1957, Fiat not only refused to negotiate with
Renault, but also dissuaded Innocenti and Lambretta from speaking with them. Renault was only able to find a potential partner in Alfa Romeo, another public enterprise. Aldo Fascetti, IRI's president, thought that the alliance could be a great opportunity to challenge Fiat's hegemony (Loubet 2000) .
The cooperation agreement between Renault and Alfa Romeo was signed in October 1958. entail a reduction in Italian production, thus affecting the production of the R-4 planned for 1962 (Loubet 1995) .
Following Petrilli's insistence, Giuseppe Lauraghi, the new Alfa Romeo CEO, halted the manufacture of both the R-4 and R-8. According to him, it was difficult to defend the production of models that directly competed with Fiat cars. When the manufacture of the R-4 was finally ready, the Italian government passed a new tax that especially affected foreign cars. The new tax was so biased that its result was that while the Fiat 500 and 600 paid on average 30,000 Italian liras per unit, the R-4 was forced to pay 62,000 liras. The new tax had an immediate effect: the 63,000 cars sold by Renault in 1963 dropped to 13,000 a year later (Loubet 1995) .
Even though the commercialization of the Dauphine worked well, Renault was unable to create common synergies with the Italian dealers. In addition, in Billancourt they thought that the Milanese acted more so on the basis of Italian national interests (always remaining loyal to Fiat over Renault's claims for greater openness) than in favour of business interests. When the Italian-made R-4 was finally launched in 1964, Renault mounted an offensive to take over (Loubet 1995, 463) Spain constitutes a clear example of this change of direction. However, FASA's production stagnated in the region of 8,000 cars per year. Eventually, Banco Santander sold its stake to Banco Ibérico in 1961. It was under the control of the Fierro family that FASA began mass production. Not only did the production capacity rise sharply, but a process was also initiated to vertically integrate production. In time, FASA took over the direct manufacture of engines, gearboxes, and bodywork (Fernández-de-Sevilla 2010b).
Renault in Spain
Banco Ibérico's sole control of FASA came to an end in 1965. At that time, FASA's annual production of Renault cars bordered on 50,000 units. As a result, the firm had become the primary centre of Renault car production outside France (Table 1) The growth in the production capacity could only be sustained if the sales network was able to sell the increasing production. Marketing and distribution capabilities were crucial in a sector marked by steadily increasing supply and a demand that had lost its impetus since the mid- After the Carnation Revolution (April 1974), which put an end to the dictatorship, the Portuguese economy fell into the same negative cycle as the other Western economies.
However, the Portuguese crisis was worsened by the country's political instability. Therefore, two thirds of assembly firms went bankrupt. In 1976, the Portuguese government launched an international call to modernize the car industry. In 1980, it was announced that Opel, Auto Europa (Volkswagen Group), and Renault were the companies selected to remain in the country 24 . A few months earlier, FASA had transferred control of the Portuguese subsidiary to Renault. 25 In doing so, Renault revealed its desire to reshape the Iberian scenario.
At the end of the 1970s, Renault was worried because both Ford and GM had opened industrial subsidiaries in Spain to serve as export platforms for low-to-medium range cars to Renault was appointing Spain as its main base in Southern Europe. As Table 2 shows, ILR never played a key role in the international structure of Renault, with its growth being cut short just when it was starting to take off. Source: Own elaboration by using Loubet (2000, 220) 
In late 1972, the Spanish government passed two decrees, known as the Ford Decrees, with the goal of reshaping the country's car industry. The rationale behind this turnabout was the need to raise the competitiveness of existing manufacturers in order to increase their exports and stimulate their specialization within the international strategy of large-scale enterprises.
However, the primary aim was to enable Ford to set up in Spain. The shift in the development 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Export Total subsidiary was positively affected by the sustained depreciation of the peseta during the 1990s. However, FASA also had to implement a tough programme to reduce the size of its workforce. With a staff of around 20,000 workers, the redundant workforce was estimated at around 7,000 workers. The plan to achieve this reduction was developed entirely in Spain.
They created a voluntary redundancy plan for people aged 58 and above, which allowed them to cut their workforce by 1,200 people annually from 1993 to 1998, and the loss of purchasing power was covered by the company. This programme permitted the correct planning of the company's organization by the end of the process. 26 The positive impact of the plan was so great that the FASA director of human resources was appointed director of human resources for the Renault Group. Once the programme finished, the Spanish factories' competitiveness was at the top of the Renault Group. As a result, exportation permitted the company's output to rise again after being stagnated for some years (see graph 1).
During the 1990s, the Spanish subsidiary achieved its competitive advantage due to specialization and staff cutbacks. Competitiveness was also achieved through the sustained depreciation of the peseta's parity. However, since the adoption of the euro, stagnation in the production assigned to Spain can be perceived, affecting the role played by the Spanish factories in the Renault Group. As Jordi Catalan (2013) 
Some Conclusions
Before WWII, Renault's international strategy was focused on the creation of commercial subsidiaries. After WWII, and especially when Pierre Dreyfus was appointed head of the enterprise, Renault intensified its international efforts, pointing to foreign production as a key part of its strategy. However, the company's operation was determined by its financial constrictions and it was forced to hold a minority position in its international affairs. Renault decided to increase its control over FASA once it had been ousted from Italy and Brazil, both interesting markets where it was experiencing remarkable success. Renault thus developed the industrial, commercial, and managerial capabilities of its Spanish subsidiary. Since then, FASA has been the main industrial foreign centre of the Renault Group.
When in the mid-1980s FASA's position was threatened by the new role of the Portuguese subsidiary, FASA was able to increase the competitiveness of its factories by reinforcing its position. At the end of the 1980s, once the Portuguese factory was closed, the Spanish subsidiary was confirmed as the main centre of Renault in Southern Europe. In the 1990s, the Spanish subsidiary gained competitiveness by applying a specific set of corporate policies fully designed in its offices. In addition, FASA reinforced its competitive advantage not only through specialization and staff cutbacks, but also through the sustained depreciations of the peseta. However, since the adoption of the euro, stagnation in the production assigned to Spain can be perceived, affecting the role played by the Spanish factories within the Renault Group.
